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CONTRACT AND CONDITIONAL ZONING
WITHOUT ROMANCE: A PUBLIC
CHOICE ANALYSIS
Philip L. Fraietta*
The growth and development of the United States after World War II left
the country needing more flexibility in zoning law. Over the past few
decades, zoning has undergone drastic changes to make the process more
flexible. Two methods used to meet this new demand are contract and
conditional zoning. Jurisdictions are split on whether to permit contract
zoning, conditional zoning, both, or neither. This is an important question
that a growing number of jurisdictions have recently encountered. This
Note seeks to propose potential solutions to the conflict by analyzing it
through public choice theory. By applying the principles of public choice
theory, this Note finds that increased flexibility in zoning will likely have the
undesired consequence of allowing legislators to easily appease interest
groups, rather than bargain for the most efficient land use allocation.
From this observation, this Note ultimately concludes that jurisdictions
should either prohibit both contract and conditional zoning or, if economic
efficiency concerns prove too great, permit both contract and conditional
zoning but apply a strict standard of judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you own property in an area zoned residential by your town. A
power company wants to construct a new power plant adjacent to your
property although the area is not zoned for it. In furtherance of this desire,
the power company offers the town eight million dollars to rezone the area,
and the town subsequently rezones the property as requested. This is
essentially what happened to eight neighboring landowners in Durand v.
IDC Bellingham, LLC1 and, perhaps counter intuitively, many jurisdictions
find this practice entirely legal.

1. 793 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2003).
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Zoning is a common and accepted practice in nearly every jurisdiction in
the United States.2 Since the U.S. Supreme Court validated the practice in
the landmark case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,3 its popularity
and complexity has proceeded at a rapid pace.
Early forms of zoning were thought to be too inflexible for the post–
World War II society, and thus zoning law has undergone various changes
One such change was the
designed at increasing flexibility.4
implementation of contract and conditional zoning. Contract zoning is
defined as “a bilateral agreement between a developer and legislative
officials entered into as a condition for the rezoning of land which often
involves the use of private covenants to restrict the land rezoned.”5
Conditional zoning is defined as “zoning that places land in a temporary use
classification that will become permanent only if the land is developed or
certain events occur within a specified period of time.”6 States disagree on
whether to allow either contract or conditional zoning, with some states
opting to allow both, some opting to only allow conditional, some opting to
allow neither, and others declining to decide on the matter.7 When viewed
through public choice theory, contract and conditional zoning are
concerning because they provide an easy way for interest groups to capture
local government officials and ultimately have conditions attached that are
inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of zoning.8 With the growing
number of states that are accepting the practice, and many others sure to
rule on it soon, it is important to provide an alternative lens through which
to analyze the practice and its implications.9
Public choice theory has been described by its late founder, James M.
Buchanan, as “the avenue through which a romantic and illusory set of
notions about the workings of governments and the behavior of persons
who govern has been replaced by a set of notions that embody more
skepticism about what governments can do and what governors will do.”10
It relies primarily on three premises: (1) that legislators, like every other
individual, will seek to maximize their own utility (i.e., gain reelection);11
(2) that voters will not serve as an adequate check on this due to their
2. See 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1:2 (5th ed. 2012).
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. See 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 1:13–14 (4th ed. 2012).
5. See id. § 1:23.
6. See id. § 1:21.
7. See infra Part III.A–D.
8. See Hanna v. Bd. of Adjustment, 183 A.2d 539, 543 (Pa. 1962) (“A basic purpose of
zoning is to ensure an orderly physical development of the city, borough, township or other
community by confining particular uses of property to certain defined areas. With such a
purpose nonconforming uses are inconsistent.”).
9. See infra Part III.A–D for a discussion of the various positions states have taken on
the issue.
10. James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11, 11 (James
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984).
11. See infra Part II.A.
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“rational-ignorance”;12 and (3) that the “collective action problem” makes it
difficult for majorities to form coalitions and thus easier for special interest
groups to gain influence in the political process.13 The theory predicts this
set of conditions will lead to legislators seeking to appease interest groups,
as doing so maximizes their likelihood of reelection.14 This is particularly
troublesome in the contract/conditional zoning realm because the discretion
and flexibility individual legislators are given makes it easier for them to
successfully appease interest groups at the potential detriment to the
community at large.15
This Note addresses the conflict between the states and offers an
alternative analysis based on public choice theory. To facilitate an
understanding of zoning law—particularly contract and conditional
zoning—Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of zoning law.
Part II of this Note provides a detailed description of public choice theory.
Part III details the conflict between the states and the various arguments
advanced on all sides. Part IV applies public choice principles to the
conflict and concludes that states should shy away from both contract and
conditional zoning, but also concludes that if the efficiency concerns are too
great to eliminate the practices, states should impose a stricter standard of
judicial review.
I. ZONING LAW GENERALLY
A general understanding of zoning law is necessary to understand the
policy concerns at play. This part first details the history of the
development of zoning. It next describes the general requirements that
must be met to implement a valid zoning plan. It then explains the
inadequacy of general rezoning. It subsequently details contract and
conditional zoning, particularly their rise to prominence. Finally, it
discusses the standard of judicial review for contract and conditional zoning
decisions.
A. The History of Zoning
“Zoning is the regulation by the municipality of the use of land within the
community” in accordance with a general plan and for the purposes set
forth in an enabling statute.16 Zoning grew out of the concept of public
nuisance,17 which protects the rights of the public to be free from activities
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C–D.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:3.
17. See David C. Keating, Exclusionary Zoning: In Whose Interests Should the Police
Power Be Exercised?, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 304, 304 (1995) (noting zoning’s roots as an
extension of public nuisance doctrine); see also Thomas E. Raccuia, Note, RLUIPA and
Exclusionary Zoning: Government Defendants Should Have the Burden of Persuasion in
Equal Terms Cases, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853, 1858 (2012) (same).
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that interfere with those rights.18 By the late nineteenth century, the failures
of nuisance doctrine to regulate land use in an industrial society became
evident as “residents in larger urban areas began to protest the loss of light
and air as taller structures were . . . built.”19 Shortly after the construction
of the forty-two story Equitable Building in Lower Manhattan, the pressure
for additional controls on building height and form became clear, and New
York City ultimately responded with the Zoning Resolution of 1916.20 The
Resolution established height and setback controls, and designated
residential districts that excluded perceived incompatible uses.21 The
Resolution was not without controversy, however, and its constitutionality
under the New York State Constitution was challenged in Lincoln Trust Co.
v. Williams Building Corp.22 The court in Lincoln Trust ultimately
approved the constitutionality of the Zoning Resolution on the grounds that
zoning is “a proper exercise of the police power.”23 Following the Lincoln
Trust decision, zoning became tremendously popular and spread quickly
throughout the country.24
The Lincoln Trust decision did not put the constitutionality question to
rest, however, as some objected to zoning on the grounds that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by depriving persons of
liberty and property without due process of law and denying equal
protection of the law.25 The Supreme Court ended the debate by upholding
zoning ordinances as a valid exercise of the state police power in Euclid.26
After Euclid, “Euclidean,” or “use zoning,” became popular throughout the
country.27
Euclidean zoning refers to the “concept of separating incompatible land
uses through the establishment of fixed legislative rules.”28 Although
Euclidean zoning provided for changes and variances, it was envisioned
that discretionary review of individual proposed uses would be the
“exception” rather than the rule and that zoning restrictions would be
uniform for each kind of building in each district.29 This concept proved to
be very rigid and has resulted in the allowance for flexibility in the
18. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 14.2 (2d ed. 2007). These acts are often those that
injure the public health or safety but also include those that are contrary to public morals.
See id.
19. 1 SALKIN, supra note 2, § 1:3.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920).
23. Id. at 210.
24. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.3 (noting that, by the time of the
Euclid decision, “some 564 cities and towns had enacted zoning” ordinances).
25. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926); see also U.S.
CONST. amend XIV.
26. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390 (“We find no difficulty in sustaining restrictions of the
kind thus far reviewed.”).
27. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.3.
28. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:5.
29. See id.
AND
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development approval process.30 Two of the methods used to create
flexibility are contract and conditional zoning, which is discussed in further
detail below.31
B. Requirements Necessary for a Valid Zoning Ordinance
This section outlines the uniform requirements necessary to implement a
valid zoning ordinance. First, it is important to note that municipalities
themselves do not have police power.32 Police power is reserved for the
state and not for its political subdivisions.33 Thus, a municipality can only
exercise power “when it has specifically or impliedly received a delegation
of such power from the state.”34 Application of this principle to zoning
makes clear that the authority to enact zoning ordinances must be
specifically delegated to municipalities in order for them to exercise the
power to zone.35 Pursuant to this requirement, states issue enabling acts
that grant the power for municipalities to zone.36
All fifty states have adopted enabling acts that are substantially patterned
after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), a guideline resulting
from the work of an Advisory Committee appointed by then–Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover.37 The SZEA: (1) declares the purposes of
zoning and defines its scope; (2) details a procedure for adopting zoning
regulations and making amendments; (3) proposes the creation of a zoning
commission; (4) permits the creation of a Board of Adjustment to hear
appeals from enforcement of the ordinance, to decide special exceptions,
and to give variances; and (5) contains provisions for the enforcement of the
regulations.38 Regarding purpose, the SZEA separates into two categories:
the first being the “grant of powers” category, and the second being the
“purposes in view” category.39 The “grant of powers” category is based on
section 1 of the SZEA, which states that the purpose of delegating the
zoning power is to “promot[e] health, safety, morals, or the general welfare
of the community.”40 The “purposes in view” category is based on section
3 of the SZEA, which lists various purposes such as “to provide adequate
light and air” and “to conserv[e] the value of buildings.”41

30. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 4.15.
31. See supra Part I.C.
32. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:8.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See id. § 1:9 (citing various state court decisions that hold that the power to zone
must be specifically delegated); see also, e.g., Good Deal of Ivy Hill, Inc. v. City of Newark,
160 A.2d 630, 632 (N.J. 1960); Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 296 (N.Y. 1972);
Roeders v. City of Washburn, 298 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D. 1980).
36. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.6.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:12.
40. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.6.
41. See id.
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Therefore, a zoning ordinance may be invalid if “it is beyond the power
conferred by the enabling act”42 or if it was “exercised for [a] purpose[]
beyond those expressed or implied in [the] enabling act.”43 Courts
generally interpret zoning enabling acts as allowing for a wide array of land
use controls and also generally defer to local legislative judgment as to
what land use regulations are needed to promote the general welfare.44
However, courts have refused to find that an enabling act confers a local
community with plenary police power.45 This small limitation allows for
courts to uphold conditional zoning “despite the lack of express language
authorizing such a technique,”46 while simultaneously allowing courts to
strike down zoning ordinances that are “unrelated to the achievement of
land use objectives”47 because they would be zoning for a purpose that is
“beyond the scope of the police power.”48 This liberalized standard helped
facilitate the move from strict Euclidean zoning to more flexible rezoning
measures and, subsequently, significantly enhanced the individual
discretion of local officials in the operation of zoning codes.49
C. Inadequacy of General Rezoning and the Move to Flexible Rezoning
Euclidean zoning “proved too rigid to meet changing community needs
and development pressures.”50 These difficulties led to many rezoning
requests, but change was difficult because of two competing concerns: the
protection of neighbors and environmentally sensitive lands versus the
possibility of leaving land underused and of imposing unnecessary
restrictions.51 Various techniques were developed over the years to address
these flexibility concerns.52 Two of which were contract and conditional
zoning.
42. Id. § 3.13.
43. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:12.
44. See id.
45. See id.; see also, e.g., Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 364
A.2d 1016, 1031 (N.J. 1976) (“[Z]oning is not a panacea for all social, cultural and economic
ills especially where they are unrelated to the use of land.”) (citations omitted).
46. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.13; see also Giger v. City of
Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Neb. 1989).
47. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 3.13; see also Belle Harbor Realty
Corp. v. Kerr, 323 N.E.2d 697, 699 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that revocation of a permit to
operate a nursing home “to assuage strident community opposition” was outside the enabling
act); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 624 N.Y.S.2d 170, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(holding that a moratorium imposed on cellular telephone antennas was outside the enabling
act).
48. See, e.g., Robyns v. City of Dearborn, 67 N.W.2d 718, 720 (Mich. 1954) (stating
that zoning exercised to lower the market value of property so that a governmental body
could acquire it cheaper by eminent domain is unconstitutional); JUERGENSMEYER &
ROBERTS, supra note 18, §3.13.
49. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 1:14.
50. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Shelby D. Green, Development
Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional
Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 389 (2004).
51. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 4.15.
52. See id.
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1. Contract Zoning
Contract zoning refers to “the process by which a local government
enters into an agreement with a developer whereby the government exacts a
performance or promise from the developer in exchange for its agreement
to rezone the property.”53 Numerous state court decisions have found
contract zoning to be illegal.54 Historically, courts had struck down the
practice on the theories that it was an illegal bargaining away or abrogation
of the police power,55 that it was inconsistent with uniformity
requirements,56 and that it may lead to corruption or favoritism.57 Today,
by contrast, courts have warmed to the idea of contract zoning and often
distinguish between illegal contract zoning and valid conditional zoning.58
The modern trend is that “illegal contract zoning is likely to be found only
where there is an express bilateral agreement that bargains away the
municipality’s future use of the police power.”59
An example of a court finding an express bilateral agreement that
bargains away the municipality’s future use of the police power is the
Florida case Chung v. Sarasota County.60 In Chung, an adjacent landowner
challenged a settlement agreement reached by a landowner and the county
in an action disputing the county’s initial refusal to rezone the landowner’s
parcel.61 The settlement agreement required the county to rezone the parcel
subject to numerous stipulations and conditions.62 The court concluded that
the settlement agreement constituted a case of improper contract zoning
because the county had “contracted away the exercise of its police power,
which constituted an ultra vires act.”63 The Chung case, therefore, is an
example of a court finding contract zoning illegal on the basis of a bilateral
agreement that bargains away the police power.

53. 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11.
54. See, e.g., V.F. Zahodiakin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127,
131 (N.J. 1952) (holding that contract zoning is an illegal bargaining away of the police
power); City of Farmers Branch v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968) (stating the same); see also 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11 n.2 (listing other
decisions).
55. See 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11 n.2 (listing decisions).
56. See, e.g., Campion v. Bd. of Aldermen, 859 A.2d 586, 601 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004);
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 501 A.2d 489, 493 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985).
57. See City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1953) (stating that
contract zoning destroys “that confidence in the integrity and discretion of public action
which is essential to the preservation of civilized society.” (quoting Osborne v. Allen, 226
S.W. 221, 224 (Tenn. 1920))).
58. See 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:11.
59. Id.
60. 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
61. See id. at 1359.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 1360.
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2. Conditional Zoning
Conditional zoning refers to the imposition of conditions on proposed
developments.64 Conditional zoning can happen in one of two ways:
(1) the conditions can be attached administratively in the special permit or
variance process; or (2) conditions can be attached in a rezoning process.65
This Note only addresses the second.
When conditions are attached by way of rezoning, conditional zoning is
very similar to contract zoning.66 Many courts distinguish the two,
however, on the grounds that contract zoning bargains away a
municipality’s police power, while conditional zoning does not.67
Conditional rezoning is therefore upheld in the majority of jurisdictions as
long as: “(1) [it] promotes the general welfare and not merely private
interests; (2) the rezoning does not otherwise constitute illegal spot zoning;
(3) the conditions imposed are reasonable and not otherwise illegal; and
(4) there is no express agreement bargaining away a municipality’s future
use of the police power.”68
A recent example of the willingness of courts to uphold unilateral
conditional zoning is the Massachusetts case Durand v. IDC Bellingham,
LLC.69 In Durand, the town of Bellingham developed a proposal to rezone
certain land from “agricultural” and “suburban” to “industrial use” in order
to increase its tax base.70 The proposal ultimately fell eight votes short of
the required two-thirds majority at a town meeting.71 Two years later, IDC
Bellingham, LLC discussed rezoning the land so that a power plant could
be built on it.72 The Town Administrator told IDC officials that the town
was eight million dollars short of what was required to construct a new high
school.73 IDC responded by publicly announcing that it would make an

64. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.11.
65. See id.; see also 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:12.
66. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:12.
67. See, e.g., Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 369 (Mass. 2003);
Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683 (N.Y. 1960); Chrismon v. Guilford Cnty., 370
S.E.2d 579, 594 (N.C. 1988). The Supreme Court of New Mexico drew a different
distinction between contract and conditional zoning. That court found that
contract zoning is illegal whenever it arises from a promise by a municipality to
zone property in a certain manner, i.e., when a municipality is either a party to a
bilateral contract to zone or when a municipality is a party to a unilateral contract
in which the municipality promises to rezone . . . [such a] contract . . . is illegal
because, in making such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of the
zoning authority to zone the property according to prescribed legislative
procedures.
Dacy v. Vill. of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 797 (N.M. 1992).
68. 3 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 44:12. For examples of courts applying this doctrinal
test, see supra note 67.
69. 793 N.E.2d 359.
70. Id. at 361.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
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eight million dollar gift to the town if IDC could build the plant.74 While
the offer clearly was made with regards to the high school, IDC stated the
town could use the money for “any municipal purpose.”75 In response to
the offer, the town held another meeting, and this time the rezoning was
The plaintiffs, eight neighboring
approved by two-thirds vote.76
landowners, filed suit against IDC, the town, the town zoning board of
appeals, and the owner of the property, alleging the rezoning constituted
illegal contract zoning.77 The court held that the eight million dollar offer
did not constitute contract zoning because voters at the town meeting were
not “bound to approve the zoning change.”78 In other words, the agreement
was unilateral. The court further held that a “voluntary offer of public
benefits is not, standing alone, an adequate ground on which to void an
otherwise valid rezoning.”79 The court concluded that there is generally no
reason to invalidate an otherwise valid rezoning because “[it] defer[s] to
legislative findings and choices without regard to motive.”80 The Durand
case, therefore, provides an example of a court upholding conditional
zoning on the theory that it is unilateral and of showing high deference to
the legislature in these matters.
D. Judicial Review of Contract and Conditional Zoning
Provisions for judicial review of zoning decisions differ by state.
However, many states authorize an appeal from a local zoning board under
the same procedures available for appeals from state administrative
agencies.81 The SZEA provides for review of decisions of the board of
adjustment by petition to a court of record alleging why the board decision
is illegal.82 The Act states that “[a]ny person . . . aggrieved by any decision
of the board of adjustment, or any taxpayer,”83 as well as “proper local
authorities of the municipality,”84 may petition the court. This standard has
led courts to recognize standing for (1) owners of property that is the
subject of the dispute, (2) persons who have interest in property that adjoins
property directly affected by the zoning decision, (3) associations acting as
an agent for members who own property or reside in the area, and (4) local
governments aggrieved by the zoning decision.85 Although SZEA provides

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 361–62.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 362–63.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.32.
See A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY
ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS § 7 (1926), available at http://www.planning.org/
growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 8.
85. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.34.
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that “any taxpayer” may petition the court,86 not all courts have found this
to provide automatic standing for all taxpayers.87
Courts have struggled to develop standards of review that protect from
abuses of power, while not overly interfering with the legislative process.88
Despite the confusion, the standard can best be broken down into two
categories: review of legislative acts and review of administrative acts.89
1. Legislative Acts
Courts traditionally accord legislative actions a strong presumption of
validity.90 This strong presumption of validity means courts typically use a
rational basis test to assess validity in contract/conditional zoning.91
Rational basis review requires a law to be “reasonable, not arbitrary and [to]
bear[] . . . a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective.”92 In
recent decades, however, courts have expressed dissatisfaction with
granting such high deference to local legislative authorities and instead
subject them to greater scrutiny.93 Although courts have yet to deviate from
rational basis review with regards to contract or conditional zoning, in the
analogous situation of “spot zoning,”94 some courts find that its quasi-

86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
87. Compare Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 676 A.2d 831, 838 (Conn. 1996)
(declining to overrule precedent that taxpayers have automatic standing), with Comm. for
Responsible Dev. on 25th St. v. Mayor of Balt., 767 A.2d 906, 915 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2001) (holding that “taxpayers must be aggrieved in order to seek judicial review”).
88. See Robert J. Hopperton, Standards of Judicial Review in Supreme Court Land Use
Opinions: A Taxonomy, an Analytical Framework and a Synthesis, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 1, 98 (1997) (noting that there is “no set formula” for the standards of judicial
review but instead “[c]onfusion, disarray, and inconsistency”); see also JUERGENSMEYER &
ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37.
89. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.”). For a more detailed discussion of rational basis review, see Richard B. Saphire,
Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88
KY. L.J. 591, 603–08 (2000).
93. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 476 (Fla. 1993) (holding that
the zoning board has the burden to show that its decision “is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or
unreasonable”).
94. “[S]pot-zoning refers to the singling out of a lot or a small area for discriminatory or
different treatment from that accorded surrounding land which is similar in character.”
Willot v. Vill. of Beachwood, 197 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ohio 1964) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 4, § 11:5. This Note treats spot zoning analogously
to contract/conditional zoning because of the high discretion awarded to policymakers in
both. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Hedrich v. Vill. of Niles, 250
N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (noting the danger of “bartering . . . legislative
discretion” (emphasis added)); Green, supra note 50, at 404 n.114 (noting the similarities
between contract zoning and spot zoning).
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judicial nature disqualifies it from deferential review.95 The leading case in
favor of this position comes from the Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano v.
Board of County Commissioners.96 In Fasano, the county commissioners
rezoned a thirty-two acre tract from single-family use to mobile home use,
and the neighbors challenged the rezoning.97 The defendant board asserted
the presumption of validity and argued that the challengers must show their
decision was arbitrary.98 The court, however, rejected to extend to the
board the presumption of validity, holding that doing so would be “ignoring
reality” that local decision groups are not the equivalent of state and
national legislatures.99 The court felt it was justified in not extending the
presumption because of “the almost irresistible pressures that can be
asserted by private economic interests on local government.”100 The
Fasano court did not go so far as to state all acts of local governments
should not be given the presumption of validity, but instead drew a
distinction between actions that are of a legislative character and actions
that are of a quasi-judicial character.101 If the action is legislative in
character, judicial deference is appropriate.102 If, on the other hand, it is
quasi-judicial in character, as the court found site-specific rezoning
classifications to be, then judicial deference is not appropriate.103 Fasano
has been met with mixed reaction around the country, with numerous states
following it, and others specifically rejecting it.104
a. Jurisdictions That Use Fasano Review
The American Law Institute (ALI) was quick to adopt Fasano review in
its Model Development Code.105 The ALI agreed with the Fasano court
that local legislatures are not equal in all respects to state and national
legislatures and that rezoning is an administrative, not a legislative,
function.106
95. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37.
96. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
97. See id. at 25.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. at 30. This analysis borrows in large part from James Madison’s concern that the
legislative process is vulnerable to capture by factions who act without regard for others. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). It also borrows from public choice theory. See
infra Part II.
101. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26–27.
102. See id. at 26.
103. See id. at 26–27.
104. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.9. Compare Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993) (adopting Fasano review and finding
rezoning subject to “strict scrutiny”), and Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 614 P.2d 947,
949–50 (Idaho 1980) (adopting Fasano review), with Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,
21 P.3d 833, 836 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting Fasano and finding spot zoning to be “an
arbitrary exercise of legislative power”), and Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 618 P.2d 601, 602
(Ariz. 1980) (rejecting the view that rezoning is not a legislative function).
105. See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-312(2) (1975).
106. See id.
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Following adoption by the ALI, numerous states began to follow Fasano
as well.107 One of the first states to do so was Idaho in Cooper v. Board of
County Commissioners.108 In Cooper, the plaintiff-appellants bought
roughly ninety-nine acres of land that had a D-2 zoning classification,
which permitted a maximum density of one home per acre.109 The
appellants applied to rezone the property to an R-5 classification, which
would allow two residential units per acre if either a central sewage facility
or central water facility were available, and three residential units per acre if
both facilities were available.110 After two hearings and deliberation, the
board voted to deny the rezoning.111 Appellants then brought suit in the
state district court, where the court applied rational basis review and found
that since the board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision, the
decision was valid.112
On appeal, appellants argued that the district court erred in characterizing
the action as legislative and instead should have considered the action as
“an administrative, quasi-judicial determination of individual rights.”113
The court explained the Fasano distinction between legislative acts and
quasi-judicial acts and ultimately held that characterizing the action of a
zoning body as quasi-judicial “in applying general rules or policies to
specific individuals, interests, or situations represent[s] the better rule. The
shield from meaningful judicial review which the legislative label provides
is inappropriate in these highly particularized land use decisions.”114 The
court went on to explain that the rationale for granting deferential review to
legislative action—that legislators are freely elected by the people and can
be removed115—was inapposite when applied to a local zoning body’s
decision as to the fate of an individual’s application to rezone, because
“[m]ost voters are unaware or unconcerned that fair dealing and consistent
treatment may have been sacrificed in the procedural informality which
accompanies action deemed legislative.”116 In other words, the Cooper
court felt voters were an inadequate check on the board with respect to
rezoning, and it was necessary for the court to apply a stricter review in
order to provide an adequate check.117
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. 614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1980).
109. See id. at 947.
110. See id. at 948.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 949.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 950.
115. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (stating
that the people’s “rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society,
by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”).
116. Cooper, 614 P.2d at 950.
117. See id. at 951 (“To allow the discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually
unlimited in the determination of individual rights is to condone government by men rather
than government by law. Accordingly, we adopt the rule which distinguishes between
legislative and quasi-judicial actions of local zoning bodies . . . .”).
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Roughly a decade after Cooper, the Florida Supreme Court adopted
Fasano in what has become a leading case in its favor—Board of County
Commissioners v. Snyder.118 In Snyder, the respondents owned a one-halfacre parcel of property that was zoned GU (general use), which allowed for
construction of a single-family residence.119 The respondents filed an
application to rezone the property to the RU-2-15 classification, which
allows the construction of fifteen units per acre.120 After the application
was filed, the Brevard County Planning and Zoning staff reviewed the
application and concluded that the proposed multifamily use was consistent
with all aspects of the comprehensive zoning plan, except that it was
located in a flood plain on which a maximum of only two units per acre was
allowed and therefore recommended the request be denied.121 The
Commission subsequently voted to deny the rezoning request without
stating a reason why, even after the respondents stated that they intended to
build only five or six units on the property.122 The respondents then filed
suit in the circuit court, where their petition was denied, but won on appeal
in the Fifth District Court of Appeal.123 The Fifth District opted to adopt
Fasano review and found that the respondent’s application for rezoning was
consistent with the comprehensive plan so that there was no stated reason
for the denial.124
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether to
adopt Fasano review.125 The court found that comprehensive rezonings
affecting a large portion of the public are legislative in nature and,
therefore, are granted a presumption of validity, but found that rezoning
actions that (1) have a limited impact, (2) are contingent on a fact arrived at
from distinct alternatives presented at a hearing, and (3) can be viewed as
“policy application, rather than policy setting” are by nature quasijudicial.126 Due to their quasi-judicial nature, the court found they should
be subject to strict scrutiny.127
b. Jurisdictions That Have Rejected Fasano
Some jurisdictions have rejected Fasano review.128 One early example
is Arizona in Wait v. City of Scottsdale.129 In Wait, the lead appellant was a
doctor who had purchased a five-acre parcel of land that was zoned R1-43
(singe family residential, one house per acre) and wanted to rezone it to an
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
See id. at 471.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 471–72.
See id. at 472.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 475.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
618 P.2d 601 (Ariz. 1980).
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S-R zoning classification (service residential) that would allow him to
construct a personal office building on the property.130 The city zoning
staff recommended that the rezoning request be denied for a number of
reasons—one being that it would be contrary to the city’s General Land Use
Plan.131 The city’s Planning and Zoning Commission disagreed with the
staff recommendation and approved the application by a four-to-three vote,
which sent it to the City Council for approval.132 The City Council
unanimously voted to deny the rezoning and the appellants filed suit.133
The appellants argued that the act of rezoning is a quasi-judicial function
and therefore not subject to rational basis review.134 The court noted that
their position was in the minority and held that rezoning is a legislative
function.135 Applying rational basis review, the court acknowledged that
the appellants argument—the diminution in value of their property
outweighs the public need to maintain the current zoning—was important,
but found that the appellants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating
that the R1-43 zoning classification was arbitrary and capricious.136
In a more recent leading case, Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, the
Supreme Court of Alaska rejected Fasano.137 In Cabana, the Kenai
Peninsula Borough traded a forty-acre parcel for a twenty-acre parcel with a
purchaser looking to use the forty-acre parcel to store and process gravel to
be sold to customers in the area.138 The Kenai Peninsula Borough Code
required that land owned by the borough must be classified before it can be
sold.139 In accordance with this requirement, the Borough Planning
Commission held a public hearing and eventually recommended a light
industrial classification for the parcel with a variance permitting material
stockpiling and related activities.140 The Kenai Peninsula Borough
Assembly then held a public hearing on the proposed classification and,
despite some objections, passed a resolution classifying the parcel as light
130. Id. at 602.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (“The enactment of the original zoning ordinance is a legislative function, and we
fail to see why the amendment of an ordinance should be of a different character. We accept
the majority view that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances constitute
legislative action. Since we hold that the decision to rezone is a legislative one, neither the
motives of the councilmen in denying the application for rezoning nor the reasons that were
spread before them to induce the denial of the rezoning request are proper subjects for
judicial inquiry.”).
136. See id. at 603. The court based its decision on the fact that zoning is “much more
than mere classification of a particular piece of property.” Id. The court noted that zoning
“[a]mong other things . . . involves consideration of future growth and development, public
streets, pedestrian walkways, drainage and sewage, increased traffic flow, [and] surrounding
property values.” Id.
137. 21 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2001).
138. Id. at 834.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 835.
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industrial.141 The appellants, led by Cabana, challenged the resolution
arguing that it violated various procedural and statutory requirements, and
that it constituted “spot zoning.”142 The appellants further argued that the
Borough Assembly’s classification was a quasi-judicial proceeding and thus
not subject to deferential review.143 The court disagreed, holding that
small-scale rezonings are legislative decisions.144 The court, relying on
past precedent, held spot zoning is “the legal term of art for a zoning
decision which affects a small parcel of land and which is found to be an
arbitrary exercise of legislative power.”145 Therefore, “[j]ust as the act of
spot zoning is a legislative act, the decision to spot zone is a legislative
decision.”146
2. Administrative Acts
Most states accord administrative zoning actions with a presumption of
validity.147 The justification for deference lies in the judgment that board
members are experts whom courts should trust or that they are more
familiar with local conditions than the reviewing court.148 However, it is
common for judges, after reciting the presumption of validity and stating
“they will not overturn an administrative ruling unless it is arbitrary or
capricious,” to sometimes engage in a review that is less deferential than
Generally,
standard rational basis review for legislative action.149
substantial evidence must support an administrative action, and thus the
board must make findings so that “the court can assure itself that the board
acted properly.”150
II. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
This part provides a general, but detailed, framework of public choice
theory. It begins by discussing the theories of self-interested legislators and
rationally ignorant voters. It next discusses the interest group theory of
government and the collective action problem. Then, it applies public
choice theory to local politics by first examining whether the rationalignorance effect is present in local politics and whether interest groups have
influence in the zoning process. Finally, it distinguishes public choice
theory from corruption.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
1996)).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 835–36.
Id. at 836. (quoting Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1020 n.6 (Alaska
Id.
See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 18, § 5.37(B).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.16.120(4)–(5) (1989).
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James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock effectively founded public
choice theory with their work The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.151 Public choice theory begins
with the assumption that policymakers, like all individuals, are motivated
by self-interest or, in economic terms, “utility maximization.”152 This
assumption allows for economists to apply economics to political decision
making.153 Three important factors distinguish decision making in the
political arena from a typical market transaction. First, rather than spending
dollars, which are allocated unevenly, in the political arena people express
their preferences (or “spend”) with votes, which are usually distributed
evenly. Second, voting takes place in the context of other voters whose
preferences will affect the eventual outcome, unlike a typical market
transaction where the outcome is determined solely by the buyer and seller.
Third, preferences are often expressed through intermediaries, usually
elected officials.154 In order to better understand how each of these factors
affects the analysis, a basic understanding of the economic principles used
is needed.
A. Self-Interested Legislators
A primary concern of public choice theory is “the agency costs that lead
government officials to make decisions in their own interests, which may
diverge from that of their constituents.”155 Given the assumption that
legislators are rational self-interest maximizers, it should be expected that
their primary interest is not pursuing the “common good.”156 Because the
political arena is not like a typical market, profit maximization cannot
simply be pegged to monetary profit. Instead, it is thought the profitmaximizing action of the legislator or administrator is to maximize her
likelihood of reelection or reappointment, as failure to do so will result in
the loss of whatever benefits come from holding office.157 This assumption
is supported by empirical evidence showing that, in Senate reelection
campaigns, candidates tend to move toward the positions held by the most

151. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
152. See id. at 19–20.
153. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979).
154. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 378–79 (4th ed.
2007); see also JAMES D. GWARTNEY, ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE
126–27 (12th ed. 2009) (discussing the differences between governments and markets).
155. See Stewart E. Sterk, Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Disputes, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 227, 248 (2011).
156. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 151, at 19–20.
157. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873, 891 (1987); see also GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 154, at 130 (“Just as
profits are the lifeblood of the market entrepreneur, votes are the lifeblood of the
politician.”).
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recently elected Senator in the state.158 The desire to get reelected could
lead to two possible outcomes: (1) the legislator makes sure that the
legislation she supports is, on average, legislation that is supported by a
majority of her constituents; or (2) the legislator supports legislation that
will get her approval of interest groups that can provide information about
the candidate to the public, thus increasing the odds that those inclined to
support the legislator will actually vote.159 It should be noted that this
model has been criticized for offering too simplistic an explanation of
legislative voting.160 Despite being generally supportive of public choice
theory, Professors Farber and Frickey argue that ideology plays an
important role in legislative voting and therefore propose a model that
accounts for ideology.161 Whether or not ideology should play a role is
beyond the scope of this Note and its basic outline of public choice theory.
Accounting for ideology, however, will not change the analysis or solutions
proposed by this Note in Part IV.
B. Rationally Ignorant Voters
Another pillar of public choice theory is its conception of the “rationally
ignorant” voter.162 Anthony Downs first developed the theory in his
political science treatise, An Economic Theory of Democracy.163 The
theory asserts, as Downs phrased it, that “it is irrational to be politically
well-informed because the low returns from data simply do not justify their
cost in time and other scarce resources.”164 To summarize, voters are
rational maximizers of self-interest and thus compare the costs and benefits
of voting. Since the time required to gather political information has an
“opportunity cost,”165 and since it is extraordinarily unlikely that one
individual vote will change the outcome of an election, the cost of voting
outweighs the marginal benefit—often times zero.166 It is therefore
“rational for voters to remain ignorant of the political process.”167 This
158. See A. Glazer & M. Robbins, How Elections Matter: A Study of U.S. Senators, 46
PUB. CHOICE 163, 171 (1985) (concluding that “a nonreviewed senator does tend to move in
the direction of the reviewed senator from his own state”).
159. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 157, at 891–92.
160. See id. at 895 (“[E]conomic models clearly overlook important aspects of the
political process.”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 265–67 (1985) (arguing that legislation may be motivated by a wide variety of
concerns).
161. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 157, at 900–01.
162. See MARK PENNINGTON, LIBERATING THE LAND: THE CASE FOR PRIVATE LAND-USE
PLANNING 59 (2002).
163. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260–76 (1957); see
also BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD
POLICIES 94 (2007).
164. See DOWNS, supra note 163, at 259.
165. In economics, “opportunity cost” is defined as [t]he highest valued alternative that
must be sacrificed as a result of choosing an option.” GWARTNEY ET AL., supra note 154, at
9.
166. See CAPLAN, supra note 163, at 94.
167. PENNINGTON, supra note 162, at 59.
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rational ignorance empowers interest groups to “capture” the political
process.168
C. The Interest Group Theory of Government
Special interest groups exist to further the interests of their members.169
Public choice theory defines a special interest as “one that generates
substantial personal benefits for a relatively small number of constituents,
while simultaneously imposing a small individual cost on a much larger,
unidentified group of voters.”170 The economic analysis of interest groups
is relatively straightforward and can be stated in conventional supply and
“The demand for transfers is based upon the
demand terms.171
organizational costs facing potential interest groups.”172 A successful
interest group will be one that can organize in a cost-efficient manner.173
The “supply” of transfers is simply the inverse—that is, those for whom it
would cost more than one dollar to organize to resist losing one dollar in the
political process.174 Without government coercion, the “supply” would not
exist; hence, political agents facilitate the process of wealth transfers.175
Political agents, motivated by the desire to get reelected, supply legislation
that concentrates benefits on special interest groups in an attempt to put
together a majority coalition of these groups.176 Although the benefits
forwarded to the special interest groups will likely be outweighed by the
costs to the voting populace at large, the latter are unlikely to be politically
active because of the rational-ignorance phenomenon explained earlier.177
Evidence of this assertion is suggested by studies that have concluded New
Deal spending by state was far more directly linked to the number of
electoral votes and the probability of winning the state than to the perceived
“need” for New Deal programs.178
1. Drawback of Interest Groups: Rent-Seeking
One concern regarding interest groups is the that government officials
will respond to their “rent-seeking”179 and the result will be inefficient
168. See id. at 60.
169. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 5 (1965).
170. See PENNINGTON, supra note 162, at 60.
171. See Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. & Robert D. Tollison, The Interest-Group Theory of
Government, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE 357, 359 (William F. Shughart II
& Laura Razzolini eds., 2001).
172. Id.
173. See id. In simpler terms successful interest groups will be those that can organize
and lobby for one dollar for a cost of less than one dollar. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 359, 363.
176. See PENNINGTON, supra note 162, at 60.
177. See id. at 60; see also supra Part II.B.
178. See Ekelund, Jr. & Tollison, supra note 171, at 364.
179. In economics, “rent” is defined as “payments for the use of an economic asset in
excess of the market price.” Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
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regulation combined with inefficient expenditure of resources to achieve
that regulation.180
Williamson v. Lee Optical181 is perhaps the best-known legal case of
rent-seeking.182 In Williamson, the Supreme Court reviewed an Oklahoma
statute, which prohibited opticians from providing lenses or eyeglass frames
without a prescription.183 The practical effect was that no optician could fit
old glasses into new frames or supply a lens—whether it be a new lens or
one to duplicate a lost or broken lens—without a prescription.184 The
Supreme Court ultimately held that the legislation was not a denial of due
process.185 Relevant to the rent-seeking inquiry, however, is the fact that
the optometrists heavily supported the legislation, and its intended
economic effects were to limit competition in the market for eyeglasses and,
thereby, increase the prices optometrists could charge.186 Because this
price increase is artificially created by the regulation, it is regarded as a
form of “rent.”187
The Williamson case therefore exemplifies the dangers of rent-seeking.
The Supreme Court called the resulting regulation “needless” and
“wasteful,”188 but nevertheless it provided a great benefit to optometrists,
who heavily supported its passage.189
2. Benefit of Interest Groups
There are, however, some benefits of interest group government. One
such example is the development of factory legislation in the nineteenth
century.190 Despite conventional wisdom, public-interest motives likely did
not lead to foreclosing children from textile industry jobs.191 Instead, it has
been argued that the owners of steam-driven mills lobbied for the
legislation in order to increase their wealth by restricting competition from
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 224 n.6
(1986). Rent-seeking, by extension simply refers to lobbying for those rents. See id. One
classic example of rent-seeking is when a domestic industry seeks protective trade laws from
foreign competition. All profits gained as a result of those protections are “rent.” See
Michael E. DeBow, The Social Costs of Populist Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 214 (1991). See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs
of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (providing a general discussion
as to how protective trade laws produce rents).
180. See Sterk, supra note 155, at 248–49.
181. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
182. See Mark Tushnet, Public Choice Constitutionalism and Economic Rights, in
LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 23, 37 (Ellen
Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990).
183. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 486.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 487–88.
186. See Tushnet, supra note 182, at 37.
187. See supra note 179 (defining rent and rent-seeking).
188. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487.
189. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190. See Ekelund, Jr. & Tollison, supra note 171, at 366.
191. See id.

2013]

ZONING WITHOUT ROMANCE

1943

water-driven mills, which operated longer hours and employed more
children.192
Furthermore, labor interests, particularly male spinner
operatives, also opposed the employment of children, in order to limit
competition for their jobs.193 So, ultimately these rent-seeking efforts
resulted in a societal and institutional change.194
D. The Collective Action Problem
The intuitive response to the interest group theory of government is that
voter majorities can outweigh numerically smaller interest groups. In order
for this to hold true, however, it must be true that group action and
individual action are analytically similar, so that rational individuals will
aggregate into rational majority voting groups.195 Mancur Olson proved
this widely held assumption false in his work The Logic of Collective
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.196 Olson argued that
individual rationality does not imply collective rationality, especially in
larger groups.197 Olson’s main support for this argument is what is known
as the “free-rider problem.”198 The free-rider problem occurs when an
individual takes advantage of the benefits of the activities of others without
paying for those benefits.199 This naturally leads to the conclusion that in
the case of organizing a group, each individual would like to contribute a
suboptimal amount because the entire group will share the benefits of her
expenditure.200 Thus, as Olson argues, rational individuals “will not act to
achieve their common or group interests,” as doing so allows other to freeride off of their efforts.201 Olson further contends that smaller groups can
sometimes effectively organize around the free-rider problem using
“informal arrangements and peer pressure.”202 Larger groups, by contrast,
typically require “formal institutions and selective incentives to organize

192.
193.
194.
195.

See id. at 366–67.
See id. at 367.
See id. at 367–68.
See Omar Azfar, The Logic of Collective Action, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 171 at 59.
196. See OLSON, supra note 169; see also Azfar, supra note 195, at 59 (“The central point
of The Logic is that this is a non-trivial and often false assumption.”).
197. See OLSON, supra note 169, at 50–51 (“Accordingly, large or ‘latent’ groups have no
incentive to act to obtain a collective good because, however valuable the collective good
might be to the group as a whole, it does not offer the individual any incentive to pay dues to
any organization working in the latent group’s interest, or to bear in any other way any of the
costs of the necessary collective action.”); see also Azfar, supra note 195.
198. See OLSON, supra note 169, at 50–51, 132–35.
199. JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS 627 (6th ed. 2012).
200. See Azfar, supra note 195, at 59.
201. See OLSON, supra note 169, at 2 (emphasis omitted); see also Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (1981) (applying the free-rider analysis to shareholder
voting and concluding that “[b]ecause other shareholders take a free ride on any one
shareholder’s monitoring, each shareholder finds it in his self-interest to be passive”).
202. Azfar, supra note 195, at 59; see OLSON, supra note 169, at 60.
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and act collectively.”203 When coupled with the fact that voters are likely
to be ignorant of political issues,204 the instinctive conclusion is that
individuals will not be able to effectively organize in large groups to
override the influence of smaller interest groups.205
E. Rational Ignorance in Local Politics?
The economist William A. Fischel has provided a strong counter
argument to the rational-ignorance theory with regard to local politics.206
Fischel begins by analogizing municipalities to business corporations.207 In
Fischel’s model, the homeowner, like the shareholder, wants the
municipality to maximize her asset value.208 However, unlike the
shareholder, the homeowner cannot diversify her assets and therefore bears
an inordinate amount of risk in owning her home.209 Additionally, unlike
the shareholder, the homeowner often cannot simply sell at a loss as a result
of poor management because the homeowner has a large portion of her
wealth tied up in the property.210 This, Fischel argues, leads to
homeowners being more cautious about their decision to sell than almost
any other transaction.211 Homeowners, as a product of their decreased
mobility, therefore have a high incentive to be informed about local politics
and to organize to prevent local laws that decrease home values.212
Critics of Fischel point out that voter participation is generally
significantly lower in purely local elections than in national elections.213
Fischel, however, argues that lower political participation could be a sign of
local voter satisfaction214 and that a serious controversy could significantly
increase local voter turnout.215 For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient
to simply acknowledge the arguments on both sides.

203. See Azfar, supra note 195, at 59; see also OLSON, supra note 169, at 46.
204. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. Ekelund, Jr. & Tollison, supra note 171, at 366 (“[T]he interest-group theory
simply states that well-organized groups win transfers through government at the expense of
the less-well-organized or unorganized segments of the polity.”).
206. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES
(2001).
207. Id. at 19.
208. See id. at 30.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 74–75.
211. See id. at 75.
212. See id. at 75–76.
213. See, e.g., SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 31 (1972) (finding 72 percent of surveyed people report
always voting in Presidential elections compared to just 47 percent in local elections); Zoltan
L. Hajnal & Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections, 38
URB. AFF. REV. 645, 646 (2003) (noting evidence that turnout in city elections may average
half that of national elections).
214. See FISCHEL, supra note 206, at 89–90.
215. See id. at 90.
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Fischel’s analysis could also be read as endorsing the interest group
theory of government if homeowners are thought of as a “group,” as some
commentators suggest they should be.216 In this paradigm, homeowners
can be thought of as a highly successful and influential interest group in
local politics.217
F. Interest Groups and Zoning
There is evidence to suggest that interest groups are active in the zoning
context.218 In a 2005 study, researchers surveyed city council members
from sixty-eight medium-sized (defined as cities with a population of
100,000–300,000) American cities.219 The results showed that 57 percent
of respondents felt interest groups were “very active” in zoning, while 36
percent felt they were “somewhat active,” and only 8 percent felt they were
“not at all” active.220 Furthermore, 46 percent of those surveyed felt
interest groups were “very” influential in zoning, while 45 felt they were
“somewhat” influential, and only 9 percent felt they were “not at all”
influential.221 The study thus provides strong evidence that interest groups
take an active and influential role in zoning.
Interest groups have also begun to see the potential for conditional
zoning to help them achieve their goals. A recent project by the Center for
Law and the Public’s Health at Johns Hopkins & Georgetown Universities
found that conditional zoning could be used in an effort to ban or restrict
fast food outlets.222 The authors argue that since most courts will uphold
conditional zoning so long as it is in the public interest,223 and promoting
public health is undoubtedly in the public interest, conditional zoning is a
viable avenue to use to restrict fast food outlets.224

216. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cooper, Anthony J. Nownes & Steven Roberts, Perceptions
of Power: Interest Groups in Local Politics, 37 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 206, 207 (2005)
(treating “neighborhood organizations” as an interest group); David R. Elkins, The Structure
and Context of the Urban Growth Coalition: The View from the Chamber of Commerce, 23
POL’Y STUD. J. 583, 591–93 (1995) (treating “neighborhood groups” as an interest group).
217. See Cooper et al., supra note 216, at 212 (including a table displaying the results of a
study that concluded that “neighborhood associations” were the most active in local politics
and had the highest level of influence).
218. See id. at 210.
219. See id. at 208.
220. See id. at 211.
221. See id.
222. See Julie Samia Mair et al., The Use of Zoning To Restrict Fast Food Outlets: A
Potential Strategy To Combat Obesity, CENTER FOR L. & PUB. HEALTH, 22 (Oct. 2005),
www.publichealthlaw.net/Zoning%20Fast%20Food%20Outlets.pdf (“[A] municipality could
rezone a residential site to allow the development of all types of restaurants except fast food
establishments or to allow only supermarkets.”).
223. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
224. See Mair et al., supra note 222, at 24.
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G. Public Choice Versus Corruption
Public choice factors should not be treated the same as standard
corruption.225 Quid pro quo politics differ from bribery, fraud, and selfdealing in three ways.226 First, a political system that encourages
legislators to represent the interests of their constituents may also provide
an incentive to monitor those legislators for standard corruption.227 Second,
strict rules on legal donations may simply drive those donations
underground, thus it is important to maintain a distinction between
donations and illegal, secret gifts.228 Third, some reform proposals
designed to counter corruption involve the use of legal incentive payments,
and mixing financial incentives with the provision of public services is
always corrupt.229 Therefore, it is important to remember for the purposes
of this Note that legislators responding to self-interest incentives should not
be understood in the same way as typical corruption is. Typical corruption
can be countered with prosecution, institutional reforms, and more effective
policing.230 Public choice factors, by contrast, are inherent in the system
and, therefore, a far more complicated restructuring of the political
decision-making rules is likely necessary to combat them.231
III. CONTRACT ZONE? CONDITIONAL ZONE? BOTH? NEITHER?
Jurisdictions are currently split on whether to allow contract and
conditional zoning, only conditional zoning, or neither. This part outlines
the conflict and explains the arguments forwarded by all sides in order to
later analyze them through a public choice perspective. It begins with
jurisdictions that only allow conditional zoning, then proceeds to
jurisdictions that allow both. It next proceeds to jurisdictions that allow
neither, and concludes with jurisdictions that have declined to rule on the
issue.
A. Jurisdictions That Only Allow Conditional Zoning
The modern trend is for jurisdictions to allow unilateral conditional
zoning, but invalidate bilateral contract zoning.232 The justification for this
distinction is that it provides needed flexibility without allowing a

225. Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 67,
67 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), lifting contribution limits to Super PACs may lessen the
prevalence of secret gifts.
229. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 225, at 67.
230. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 45, 87 (1994) (discussing how to address corruption concerns in zoning).
231. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 151, at 283–95.
232. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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bargaining away of the police power.233 Professor Judith Welch Wegner
has suggested that the distinction has little practical meaning and instead
serves primarily to describe the ultimate outcome and create an apparent
dichotomy of classification, without fully considering the potential
overlap.234 Nevertheless, it is accepted as the modern trend.235
1. History of the Modern Trend and the Words of Economic Commentators
The history of how the modern trend emerged is important. Initially,
courts and academics were hostile to the idea of contract zoning.236 Some
courts struck down the practice as an illegal bargaining away or abrogation
of the police power.237 Others struck down the practice as inconsistent with
uniformity requirements.238 And others rejected the practice for fear of
corruption or favoritism.239
Despite the then general rejection of the practice, New York expressed its
approval of contract zoning in Church v. Town of Islip.240 In Church,
neighboring property owners brought suit against the Town of Islip and
against its Town Board to have a zoning change from a Residence A
classification to a Business classification voided as unconstitutional.241 The
neighbors contended that the rezoning was illegal contract zoning because
the Town Board’s consent to the rezoning was subject to various
conditions.242 The court recognized the growing population of Suffolk
County and held that, “[s]ince the Town Board could have . . . zoned [the]

233. See, e.g., Dacy v. Vill. of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 797 (N.M. 1992) (holding that
“one form of contract zoning is legal: a unilateral contract in which a party makes a promise
in return for a municipality’s act of rezoning”); Chrismon v. Guilford Cnty., 370 S.E.2d 579,
586 (N.C. 1988) (holding that North Carolina now approves conditional zoning and that it
will add a “valuable and desirable flexibility” to the zoning process).
234. See Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals,
65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 980 (1987).
235. See Green, supra note 50, at 451 (“The modern trend is in favor of upholding
conditional zoning.”).
236. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 21 (2005) (“[C]ourts and academics initially expressed
strong disapproval of contract zoning . . . .”).
237. See V.F. Zahodiakin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131
(N.J. 1952).
238. See Campion v. Bd. of Aldermen, 859 A.2d 586, 601 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 501 A.2d 489, 493 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
239. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956) (stating that if a city could
legislate by contract, “each citizen would be governed by an individual rule based upon the
best deal that he could make with the governing body”); City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 263
S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn. 1953) (stating that contract zoning destroys “that confidence in the
integrity and discretion of public action which is essential to the preservation of civilized
society” (quoting Osborne v. Allen, 226 S.W. 221 (Tenn. 1920))).
240. 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960).
241. See id. at 681.
242. See id.
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corner for business without any restrictions, we fail to see how reasonable
conditions invalidate the legislation.”243
The Church court set the stage for the movement toward conditional
zoning, and its decision was followed by commentators writing in support
of the practice on economic efficiency grounds.244 A commentator at the
forefront of the issue was Professor Robert C. Ellickson, who argued that
the goal of land use controls from an economic efficiency standpoint was to
minimize “the sum of nuisance costs, prevention costs, and administrative
costs.”245 From that premise, Ellickson concluded that zoning would
“inevitably result[] in considerable prevention and administrative costs”—
meaning it must result in large reductions in nuisance costs to be
efficient.246 From Ellickson’s perspective, this is unlikely because market
allocations of land could just as effectively reduce nuisance costs as a
zoning system; however, the zoning system runs the danger of the zoning
Perhaps
drafters attempting to eliminate all nuisance costs.247
counterintuitively, it is not desirable for zoning drafters to eliminate all
nuisance costs because doing so will impose higher direct and indirect costs
on the whole population than benefits on the select few the zoning
ordinance is intended to protect.248 From these observations, Ellickson
concluded that mandatory standards in zoning are costly, but such costs
could be reduced if zoning prohibitions could be lifted by damage
payments.249 Ellickson endorsed contract and condition zoning as two
ways of allowing for prohibitions to be lifted by damage payments.250
Professor Lee Anne Fennell also found economic support for bargainedfor zoning.251 Fennell argued that because zoning law is usually based on
the subjective views of a political majority, it is unlikely to provide an
efficient initial allocation of entitlements between the landowner and the

243. Id. at 683.
244. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines As Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 708 (1973); Lee Anne Fennell,
Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20–25
(2000); Jennifer G. Brown, Note, Concomitant Agreement Zoning: An Economic Analysis,
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 110.
245. Ellickson, supra note 244, at 690. Ellickson defines nuisance costs as those resulting
from “harmful externalities [that] decrease the utility and thus the value of neighboring
property.” Id. at 688. He defines prevention costs as “nonadministrative expenditures made,
or opportunity costs incurred, by either a nuisance maker or his injured neighbor to reduce
the level of the nuisance costs.” Id. And, he defines administrative costs as “both public and
private costs of getting information, negotiation, writing agreements and laws, policing
agreements and rules, and arranging for the execution of preventive measures.” Id. at 689.
246. See id. at 693.
247. See id. at 693–94.
248. See id. at 694–95.
249. See id. at 708.
250. See id. (“[C]onditional use permits [and] contract zoning . . . are actually vehicles by
which local governments agree to waive inefficient standards when offered a sufficiently
attractive package of donations and preventative measures.”).
251. See Fennell, supra note 244, at 84–85 (concluding that “[e]fficient land use requires
more flexibility . . . than . . . judicial bargaining limits can offer”).
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community.252 Furthermore, Fennell acknowledged that if the interest
group theory of government is accepted, the initial allocation of property
rights might diverge even further from the social optimum.253 Therefore,
whether the law represents the subjective view of a majority or an interest
group, it is unlikely to allocate property rights at the socially optimal level.
However, according to Fennell, Pareto superior254 improvements from this
original poor allocation can be achieved through bargaining.255 To
illustrate this point, Fennell imagines a market setting where the efficient
allocation point is where the marginal cost to the landowner equals the
marginal benefit to the community at large.256 The way to achieve said
equilibrium point is through a bargaining process where the land use
Thus, Fennell supports
“winner” can compensate the “losers.”257
bargained-for zoning as a way to make Pareto superior improvements to the
suboptimal initial allocation.
Professor Jennifer G. Brown, then writing as a student, also endorsed the
Fennell view.258 Brown argued that a restrictive zoning classification could
impose costs on a landowner that exceed potential damage to the
community from a rezoning of the landowner’s property.259 Brown
252. See id. at 20; see also David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened
Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1269 (1997) (“[O]ver-regulation may benefit the dominant
political majority even though it does not maximize the welfare of the community as a
whole.”).
253. See Fennell, supra note 244, at 20 n.81.
254. In economics, “Pareto superiority is the principle that one allocation of resources is
superior to another if at least one person is better off under the first allocation than under the
second and no one is worse off.” Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488 (1980).
255. See Fennell, supra note 244, at 21. The original justification for bargaining in land
use comes from the Coase Theorem. The Coase Theorem predicts that, in the absence of
transaction costs, only net socially beneficial development projects will occur because
whenever current residents value stopping a project more than the developer values
proceeding with that project, the current residents will simply purchase the developer’s
entitlement and thus, a bargain will have occurred that produced the socially beneficial
outcome. See Dana, supra note 252, at 1248 n.15 (explaining the Coase Theorem); see also
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (finding that where
“market transactions are costless . . . a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it
would lead to an increase in the value of production”).
256. See Fennell, supra note 244, at 22–25; see also William A. Fischel, Equity and
Efficiency Aspects of Zoning Reform, 27 PUB. POL’Y 301, 304 (1979) (making a similar
argument from which Fennell largely borrows).
257. See Fennell, supra note 244, at 24. A critique of this argument is that it assumes
policymakers can measure when the equilibrium point has been reached, but this may in fact
be an impossible task as no single individual, or even group of individuals, has the requisite
knowledge necessary to know when equilibrium has been reached. See F.A. Hayek, The Use
of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945) (“The peculiar character of the
problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge
of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated
form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge
which all the separate individuals possess.”). See generally PENNINGTON, supra note 162, at
35–57 (using Hayek’s central argument to advocate for the abolition of all zoning).
258. See Brown, supra note 244, at 110.
259. See id.
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asserted that contract zoning, on the other hand, “overcomes this sort of
inefficiency by giving the landowner the chance to develop the land more
intensively and bear the costs that may result from the more intensive
development.”260
2. Acceptance of the Trend: Chrismon
Courts in several states have started to accept the economic rationale.261
The leading case embracing this position is Chrismon v. Guilford
County.262 In Chrismon, one of the defendants had been operating a
business consisting of storing and selling grain and selling and distributing
chemicals on a tract of land adjacent to his residence since 1948.263 In
1964, Guilford County adopted a zoning ordinance, which zoned the
property as “A-1 Agricultural.”264 The storage and sale of grain was
permitted under the new classification, but the sale and distribution of
agricultural chemicals was not.265 However, because the activity preexisted
the ordinance, the nonconforming use was allowed, but that element of the
business could not be expanded.266 The plaintiffs in the case bought land
next to an additional tract of land owned by the defendant.267 In 1980, the
defendant expanded his activities onto the land next to the plaintiffs’, and
the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Guilford County Inspections
Department.268 The defendant responded by requesting that the County
rezone the property to “Conditional Use Industrial District.”269 After
holding a public hearing concerning the matter, the Guilford County Board
of Commissioners voted to rezone the property as requested.270 The
plaintiffs immediately filed suit alleging, among other things, that the

260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Mayor of Jackson, 749 So.2d 54,
57–60 (Miss. 1999) (explaining the conflict and holding that the contingency zoning
agreement did not bargain away the police power and “was both legal and beneficial”);
Chrismon v. Guilford Cnty., 370 S.E.2d 579, 586 (N.C. 1988) (“[W]e are persuaded that
[conditional zoning], when properly implemented, will add a valuable and desirable
flexibility to the planning efforts of local authorities.”); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz,
174 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Wis. 1970) (“The virtue of allowing private agreements to underlie
zoning is the flexibility and control of the development given to a municipality to meet everincreasing demands for rezoning in a rapidly changing area.”); see also Super Wash, Inc. v.
City of White Settlement, 131 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds,
198 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. 2006); State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 422 P.2d 790, 796
(Wash. 1967).
262. 370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988).
263. See id. at 581.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 581–82.
270. See id. at 582.
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County’s actions constituted contract zoning.271 The trial court held that it
did not constitute contract zoning, but the appellate court held that it did.272
The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the matter and
concluded the court of appeals decision “virtually outlaw[ed]” conditional
zoning, thus making it appropriate to address its legality in North
Carolina.273 The court engaged in a discussion of the benefits of
conditional zoning, namely that “it permits a given local authority greater
flexibility in balancing conflicting demands.”274 While acknowledging the
potential concerns,275 the court adopted conditional zoning in North
Carolina and argued that conditional zoning, “when properly implemented,
will add a valuable and desirable flexibility to the planning efforts of local
authorities throughout [the] state.”276 Later in the decision, the court
explained its distinction between contract and conditional zoning, namely
that conditional zoning is a unilateral transaction while contract zoning is a
bilateral transaction. It further explained that conditional zoning preserves
the local zoning authority’s decision-making authority, while in contract
zoning it abandons that authority by binding itself to the agreement.277 The
Chrismon court therefore adopted conditional zoning for its greater
flexibility, while drawing the common distinction from contract zoning.278
Other courts have, like the Chrismon court, found that conditional zoning
provides needed flexibility and efficiency while still preserving the state’s
police power.279
B. Jurisdictions That Openly Permit Both
As stated earlier, the distinction between conditional and contract zoning
may be in name only;280 however, at least two states, including Washington
and Maine, openly permit both.281 In City of Redmond v. Kezner,282 the
Supreme Court of Washington held that a “concomitant agreement
contain[ed] no express promise by the city to rezone.”283 The court noted,
however, that the distinction for the purposes of validity was

271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 583.
274. Id. at 584.
275. See id. at 584–85 (discussing how other courts had objected to conditional zoning on
the basis that it constituted illegal spot zoning, that is it not authorized by the state’s enabling
legislation, and that it results in an improper and illegal abandonment of the local
government’s police powers).
276. See id. at 586.
277. See id. at 594.
278. See supra notes 67, 233 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
280. See Wegner, supra note 234, at 980.
281. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30A, §§ 4301, 4352(8) (2010); Chrobuck v. Snohomish
Cnty., 480 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1971); see also Green, supra note 50, at 485–88.
282. 517 P.2d 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
283. Id. at 630.
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unimportant.284 As the Supreme Court of Washington explained in
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County,285 “concomitant agreement[s] provide[] a
source of flexibility by allowing an intermediate use permit, between
absolute denial and complete approval of the petition.”286 In other words,
the court felt a zoning ordinance should only be declared invalid if it could
be shown that there was no valid reason for the change, if it was clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, or if the city was using the concomitant
agreement solely for the benefit of private speculators.287
Maine has opted to permit both conditional and contract zoning by
statute.288 The Maine statute requires the planning board to conduct a
public hearing on a developer’s proposed contract zoning agreement and to
provide notice of this hearing to the public and the neighboring
landowners.289
It has also been suggested that Nebraska accepts both conditional and
contract zoning.290 The leading Nebraska case is Giger v. City of
Omaha.291 In Giger, the Midlands Development Co. purchased property
and sought a rezoning classification to allow it to establish a mixed
residential/commercial project on the property.292 Midlands successfully
negotiated four separate agreements with the city, collectively known as the
“the development agreement.”293 After the city was hesitant to grant the
rezoning application, Midlands offered nineteen acres of its land as
parkland, but the planning board still rejected the offer.294 Midlands then
bettered its offer, this time offering to donate twenty-five acres and to
contribute over 400,000 dollars for “certain off-site public street
improvements.”295 This offer was accepted by the planning board but
rejected by the City Council.296 Eager to have the rezoning completed,
Midlands met with City Councilman David Stahmer, an opponent of the
project, in an attempt to convince him to support the project.297 Stahmer
agreed to change his vote in exchange for Midlands donating thirty-six
acres as parkland and promising to “locate all future residential buildings
284. See id. (stating that even “[i]f the city ha[d] made the promises claimed, they [would
not be] illegal under the Mhyre rationale in which the city promised to rezone.”).
285. 480 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1971).
286. Id. at 507.
287. See id. at 506. (citing State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 422 P.2d 790, 796
(Wash. 1967)).
288. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30A, §§ 4301, 4352(8) (2010).
289. See id.
290. See Eric Pearson, Contract Zoning in Nebraska After Giger v. City of Omaha, 23
CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 199 (1990) (finding that the holding in Giger endorsed contract
zoning); Michael Wainwright Whitcher, Comment, Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC:
Towns for Sale?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 871, 878 n.37 (2005) (same).
291. 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989).
292. See id. at 187–88.
293. See id. at 188.
294. See Pearson, supra note 290, at 197.
295. Id.
296. See id. at 197–98.
297. See id. at 198.
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outside the flood plain.”298 Midlands accepted this arrangement and the
City Council approved the rezoning.299 Neighboring landowners brought
suit asserting that the rezoning agreement constituted illegal contract
rezoning.300 The court upheld the rezoning and determined that a “city
should be permitted to condition rezoning ordinances on the adoption of an
agreement between the developer and the city.”301 In order to avoid
confusion, the court opted to refer to this rezoning arrangement as
“conditional zoning,” although the agreement was bilateral.302
C. Jurisdictions That Permit Neither
Some jurisdictions permit neither contract nor conditional zoning.303
Two jurisdictions that consistently prohibit contract and conditional zoning
are Connecticut304 and Pennsylvania.305
The leading Connecticut case against contract and conditional zoning is
Bartsch v. Planning & Zoning Commission.306 In Bartsch, abutting
landowners appealed from a Town Commission’s grant of a zone change to
allow construction of a medical office building in what had been a
residential zone.307 The court ruled that the commission had “grossly
violated the statutory uniformity requirement by requiring . . . that a buffer
zone be created between the property at issue and the surrounding
properties as a prerequisite to its approval of a zone change.”308 Although
the court declined to rule on the conditional zoning challenge, its holding
has been interpreted as requiring “that zone changes may be conditionally
granted only when regulations authorize conditions to be imposed in
specific circumstances, and when the regulations are uniformly applied.”309

298. Id.
299. See id.
300. See Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 189 (Neb. 1989).
301. Id. at 190.
302. Id.
303. See Kaufman v. Zoning Comm’n, 653 A.2d 798, 812 (Conn. 1995) (“[Z]one changes
may be conditionally granted only when regulations authorize conditions to be imposed in
specific circumstances, and when the regulations are uniformly applied.”); Carlino v.
Whitpain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. 1982) (“‘Contracts . . . have no place in a
zoning plan and a contract between a municipality and a property owner should not enter
into the enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations.’” (quoting Hous. Petroleum Co. v.
Auto. Prods. Credit Ass’n, 87 A.2d 319, 322 (N.J. 1952))).
304. See CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2 (West 2011) (“[Zoning] regulations shall be
uniform for each class or kind of buildings, structures or use of land throughout each
district . . . .”).
305. See Carlino, 453 A.2d at 1388 (declining to accept contract or conditional zoning);
see also Miravich v. Twp. of Exeter, 54 A.3d 106, 111–12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)
(reiterating Pennsylvania’s opposition to contract and conditional zoning).
306. 506 A.2d 1093 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
307. See id. at 1094–95.
308. Id. at 1095.
309. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm’n, 653 A.2d 798, 812 (Conn. 1995) (citing Bartsch, 506
A.2d 1093 at 1095–96).
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The leading Pennsylvania case is Carlino v. Whitpain Investors.310 In
Carlino, a developer was constructing an apartment complex across from
the appellant’s residence.311 In 1973, the township had agreed to rezone the
property from a single-family classification to a multifamily classification;
however, unbeknownst to the appellants, in 1978 the township had included
a provision that required an access road to a major highway also be built.312
The appellants sought an injunction alleging that the original rezoning was
contractually conditioned on there being no access road.313 The court
declined to uphold conditional zoning, reiterating that “individuals cannot,
by contract, abridge police powers which protect the general welfare and
public interest.”314
The courts in Connecticut, therefore, are concerned with the lack of
uniformity in contract and conditional zoning, while the Pennsylvania
courts are concerned with the state bargaining away its police powers.
D. Jurisdictions That Have Declined To Rule on the Issue
North Dakota,315 Arkansas,316 and Indiana317 have declined to rule on the
issue. North Dakota recently did so in Hector v. City of Fargo.318 In
Hector, the appellants submitted a request to rezone land classified as
“agricultural” to “‘general commercial,’ which would allow the land to be
used for retail, service, office and commercial uses.”319 The appellant’s
initial request sought to change a total of approximately 145 acres of
land.320 City representatives voiced concerns with the initial request—
mainly how it might affect road access points, utility easements, and
construction issues.321 In response to these concerns, the appellants
submitted a revised application that requested that approximately 132 acres
be rezoned.322 City officials expressed concerns about the second plan
regarding storm water retention, and in response the appellants offered a
third plan that requested that approximately 128 acres be rezoned.323 The
third plan was submitted to the staff of the City of Fargo Planning
310. 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1982).
311. See id. at 1386.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 1387.
314. Id. at 1388.
315. See Hector v. City of Fargo, 760 N.W.2d 108, 115 (N.D. 2009) (declining to rule on
the legality of contract zoning).
316. See Murphy v. City of W. Memphis, 101 S.W.3d 221, 226 (Ark. 2003) (declining to
rule on the legality of contract zoning).
317. See Ogden v. Premier Props., USA, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 661, 668–70 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (noting that Indiana has not ruled on the legality of contract zoning and declining to do
so).
318. 760 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 2009).
319. See id. at 109.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 110.
323. See id.
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Department, which ultimately recommended that the City Commission
reject the rezoning request.324 The City Commission held a public hearing
and decided that, although the Planning Department staff had been
generally supportive of commercial expansion, neighborhood opposition
recommended denial of the request, and therefore the request was denied.325
On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the appellants argued that
the city engaged in illegal contract zoning by having the initial negotiations
with them.326 While noting that contract zoning is generally illegal
throughout the country and that the court had never ruled on contract
zoning in North Dakota, the court declined to set North Dakota precedent
on the issue in the case as it held there was “no instance of contract zoning
between the City of Fargo and the Hectors.”327
The Supreme Court of Arkansas also declined to rule on the legality of
contract zoning in Murphy v. City of West Memphis.328 In Murphy, a
company wanted to sell fireworks within the city, but an ordinance made
doing so illegal.329 A competitor company was exempt from the ordinance
because it had been grandfathered in.330 The prohibited company filed suit
against the city, and at a public hearing the company agreed to dismiss the
lawsuit if the city voted in favor of an ordinance allowing it to sell
fireworks at a specified location.331 The city passed several zoning
ordinances to allow this, and the ordinances were subsequently challenged
as contract zoning.332 The trial court found that the only reason the city
passed the zoning ordnances was to settle the lawsuit, but held that that was
acceptable if the ordinances were passed through a bona fide zoning
procedure.333 The supreme court agreed and found that, although contract
zoning was an issue of first impression for Arkansas, none of the
circumstances that traditionally give rise to contract zoning were present
and therefore declined to hold on the legality of contract zoning in the
case.334
Indiana has most recently declined to rule on the legality of contract
zoning in Ogden v. Premier Properties, USA, Inc.335 In Ogden the City
Council voted to rezone certain property from residential to commercial.336
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 115.
327. See id.
328. 101 S.W.3d 221 (Ark. 2003).
329. See id. at 223.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 223–24.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 224.
334. See id. at 226 (“[T]he question of the legality of contract zoning in the State of
Arkansas is not an issue that need be addressed by this court in the instant appeal.”); see also
PH, LLC v. City of Conway, 344 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Ark. 2009) (again declining to rule on
the legality of contract zoning).
335. 755 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
336. See id. at 664.
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The developer had filed a request to rezone the property four years
earlier.337 That request was recommended for denial by the Area Plan
Commission and was subsequently denied by the City Council.338 The
developer then filed another two requests to rezone the property but each
was denied.339 All of the requests “included a use and development
commitment . . . which placed restrictions and requirements on the
proposed development.”340 The City Council considered the developer’s
latest request at a hearing where the developer “introduced a document
titled ‘Covenant’ that contained written commitments ‘in addition to the
covenants set forth in the Use and Development Commitment.’”341 The
commitments were conditioned on the City Council approving the request
and were binding on the developer for twenty years.342 The City Council
subsequently voted in favor of the rezoning request.343 Neighboring
landowners filed suit alleging, among other claims, that the rezoning
constituted illegal contract zoning.344
The court noted that it had never ruled on the legality of contract zoning
and declined to do so.345 The court based its decision on Prock v. Town of
Danville,346 where it had previously declined to rule on the legality of
contract zoning.347 In Prock, the Town was a party to the agreement and
the court still declined to rule on contract zoning.348 Here, the town was not
a party to the agreement, making the case for contract zoning significantly
weaker.349 Furthermore, as in Prock, the rezoning was approved before the
agreement became effective, meaning it was impossible for the town to
have contracted away its police power.350 Based on these facts, the court
found it unwise to rule on the legality of contract zoning at that time.351
IV. EITHER PROHIBIT BOTH CONTRACT AND CONDITIONAL ZONING OR
HEIGHTEN THE STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The conflicting positions of some courts,352 as well as others’ hesitation
to rule on the issue,353 demonstrates an overall confusion regarding the
337. See id.
338. Id.
339. See id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 664–65.
343. Id. at 665.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 668–70.
346. 655 N.E.2d 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
347. See id. at 561.
348. See id. at 560–61.
349. See Ogden, 755 N.E.2d at 670–71.
350. See id. at 669.
351. See id. at 668–70 (declining to rule on the legality of contract zoning). This decision
has been criticized as “evasive and superficial,” but nevertheless Indiana has declined to
address contract zoning. See Green, supra note 50, at 420.
352. See supra Part III.A–C.
353. See supra Part III.D.
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implications of contract and conditional zoning. This part begins by
applying public choice principles to the problem and then recommends two
solutions for conflicted states. The first solution is to outlaw both contract
and conditional zoning because of their vulnerability to public choice
concerns. The second solution recognizes that contract and conditional
zoning may provide needed flexibility to the zoning process and, therefore,
recommends that jurisdictions that opt to permit them apply a Fasano-like
standard of judicial review when evaluating the decisions in court.
A. Public Choice and Contract/Conditional Zoning
Both contract and conditional zoning are highly vulnerable to capture by
interest groups. Because both provide legislators with a wide range of
discretion in what they bargain for,354 it is likely legislators will opt to
bargain for conditions favored by influential interest groups in the
locality.355 The high level of discretion makes contract and conditional
zoning more susceptible to agency capture than Euclidean zoning.
Euclidean zoning, due to its uniformity and lack of discretion,356 is only
vulnerable to capture during the drafting of the original zoning allocation.
Once the allocation is set, it is far more costly for interest groups to lobby
for a change to the entire code than it is to lobby for a particular contractual
condition on an individual parcel.357 Even accepting Professors Farber and
Frickey’s argument that ideology plays a major role in legislative
decisions,358 legislators are still likely to appease interest groups so long as
those groups’ views are consistent with their ideological outlook.
Both scenarios are concerning for two reasons. First, acting to appease
interest groups can often result in inefficient and burdensome regulations,
or lack thereof, that do not serve the interests of the public at large.359 And
second, even though interest group lobbying may have beneficial results,360
contract and conditional zoning allow legislators to use the zoning system
for purposes outside its intended purpose. The intended function of zoning,
as the Hanna court eloquently stated, was “to ensure an orderly physical
development of the city, borough, township or other community by
confining particular uses of property to certain defined areas.”361 While it
354. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part II.A, C.
356. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
357. Recall that interest groups can only be effective when the benefits gained by their
lobbying outweigh the costs of lobbying, so interest groups will prefer to lobby when it is
cheapest to do so. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Like the situation with
legislators, contract and conditional zoning are cheaper for interest groups to lobby for due
to their flexibility.
358. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
359. See supra Part II.C.1; see also Dana, supra note 252, at 1269 (discussing the
negatives of overregulation).
360. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing how interest group involvement led to laws
prohibiting child labor); see also notes 222–24 and accompanying text (discussing how
conditional zoning could be used to combat obesity).
361. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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is undoubtedly true that SZEA envisions broader purposes of zoning, these
purposes are still consistent with a desire to make decisions that improve
the general welfare of the community at large, not influential interest
groups.362 So, while it is certainly possible that appeasing influential
interest groups may lead to improvements in the general welfare of the
community at large, there is no guarantee this will be the case, and making
it easier for legislators to act without that purpose only increases the
likelihood that rezoning decisions will not be made consistent with the
intended goals of zoning.
It is also unlikely that the distinctions drawn by courts regarding the
difference between conditional and contract zoning will provide a
solution.363 Courts draw the distinction based on whether the municipality
has entered into a bilateral or unilateral contract,364 or whether it has lost its
independent decision-making power.365 But, from a public choice
perspective neither distinction is relevant. The former distinction still
allows for legislators to engage in a bargaining process and negotiate for
conditions they feel interest groups desire. The latter distinction, while of
constitutional importance, is unrelated to public choice issues and,
therefore, beyond the scope of this Note.
Both the Giger case and the Durand case provide evidence of likely
agency capture in the unilateral contract realm. Recall in Giger, Midlands
had to directly negotiate with Councilman Stahmer, and Stahmer did not
agree to vote for the rezoning until Midlands agreed to his set of
conditions.366 The individualized discretion Stahmer enjoyed in the
negotiation process would have allowed him to advocate for virtually any
condition he felt appropriate. Further recall in Durand, the Town
Administrator made IDC aware that the town was eight million dollars short
of what it needed to construct a new school, and only after IDC publicly
promised to donate eight million dollars to the town did the town vote to
rezone the property.367 This is not to say that the community did not
benefit from the new parkland in the Giger case or that a new school did not
benefit the community in the Durand case, but the discretion given to
individual legislators, or a small group of legislators, makes it far too easy
to appease the wishes of interest groups.
Furthermore, courts that have expressed concerns with contract and
conditional zoning have not done so in the public choice context.
Connecticut has expressed concerns due to its statutory uniformity
requirement,368 while Pennsylvania has done so due to fears of bargaining
away the police power.369 While this Note ultimately advocates for the
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 67, 233 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 294–302 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 306–09 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 310–14 and accompanying text.
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same conclusion reached by the courts in Connecticut and Pennsylvania, it
is important for courts to reach that conclusion acknowledging public
choice concerns. In Connecticut, all it will take is for the legislature to
amend the uniformity requirement to allow at least conditional zoning. In
Pennsylvania, courts could choose to change course and adopt the modern
trend to uphold conditional zoning because the practice does not necessarily
bargain away the police power. Rooting the analysis in public choice
concerns would provide a stronger resistance to contract and conditional
zoning in the states going forward.
Courts that feared contract and conditional zoning due to the potential for
abuse and corruption were on the right track.370 But, they too missed the
overall point. As stated earlier, public choice and corruption are not one
and the same.371 By writing in the language of corruption, courts gave
proponents of contract and conditional zoning an easy response: corruption
can be dealt with through prosecution, institutional reforms, and more
effective policing.372 Stating the fears in terms of public choice makes
them more difficult to overcome.373 If self-interested legislators are an
inherent part of the system,374 then laws within the system will have to
acknowledge that reality.
Finally, voters cannot be trusted as an adequate check on legislators from
appeasing interest groups. The rational-ignorance effect suggests that
voters simply will not devote the adequate amount of time and attention to
educate themselves on local issues.375 That limitation allows for local
legislators to appease interest groups without the majority of the voting
population even being aware of it. While Fischel does raise a strong
theoretical counter argument,376 the empirical evidence cuts against him.377
Furthermore, it may be appropriate to view neighborhood associations as an
interest group, and doing so leads to the conclusion that they are an
influential group, particularly in the zoning context.378 Even if the majority
was educated on local issues and not viewed as an interest group, it is
unlikely that it would be able to organize and effectively petition the local
government for favorable change due to the collective action problem.379
Free-riding concerns make it unlikely that a large group of individuals will
be able to effectively organize since it is easy to reap the benefits of
someone else’s activity without paying for those benefits.380

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.G.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 206–12 and accompanying text.
See supra note 213.
See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra notes 198–05 and accompanying text.
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Analyzing contract and conditional zoning through a public choice lens
makes clear that none of the differing views on the issue satisfy public
choice concerns. This Note therefore proposes two new solutions to the
conflict.
B. Solution One: Prohibit Both Contract and Conditional Zoning
The first, and optimal, solution is to prohibit both contract and
conditional zoning and to do so citing public choice concerns. Prohibiting
both contract and conditional zoning would take away dangerous discretion
from legislators,381 and therefore make it more difficult for interest groups
to capture the rezoning process. Doing so citing public choice concerns
would acknowledge the realities of the system and make law accordingly.
It would mean a more general return to rigid Euclidean zoning that was not
intended to be open to discretionary changes often.382 This, however, may
be too impractical given the contemporary need for flexibility in zoning.383
As Professors Ellickson, Fennell, and Brown accurately observe, rigid
zoning procedures will likely result in inefficient allocations of land
rights.384
The counter to that problem, as first observed by Professor Coase,385 and
subsequently adopted by Ellickson,386 Fennell,387 and Brown,388 is to allow
for a system of bargaining that will likely lead to Pareto superior
improvements. While the bargaining model has some criticisms—namely
the Hayekian critique that legislators lack the necessary information needed
to know when a Pareto superior improvement has been made,389 and that
legislators are likely bargaining not as representatives of the public, but as
representatives of themselves and the interest groups that better their odds
at reelection390—its general logic is strong and is accepted by many
commentators and jurisdictions alike.391 Furthermore, the critiques lend
themselves to the more radical solution of outlawing zoning altogether, as
the Hayekian criticism suggests that legislators will inevitably misallocate
resources in the initial zoning plan, and the public choice criticism suggests
that legislators will draft the initial zoning plan in accordance with what

381. See supra notes 366–67 and accompanying text (discussing how Giger and Durand
provide evidence of agency capture made easier by the discretion given to legislators).
382. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
383. See supra Part III.A (discussing how the desire for flexibility led to the adaptation of
contract and conditional zoning and how economically oriented commentators led to push
for such change).
384. See supra notes 244–60 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 251–57 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
390. See supra Parts II.A, C.
391. See supra Part III.A (discussing the commentators and jurisdictions that accept the
bargaining flexibility argument).
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interest groups want.392 While outlawing zoning completely should not be
dismissed outright, the implications of such a decision are beyond the scope
of this Note.393 The next section will therefore suggest an alternate solution
that is consistent with both flexibility and public choice concerns.
C. Solution Two: Allow Contract and Conditional Zoning but
Apply a Stricter Fasano-like Standard of Review
The alternate conclusion is to allow contract and conditional zoning, but
to apply a stricter standard of review that is shaped after Fasano. The
benefit of the Fasano standard is that it allows legislators the needed
flexibility to make Pareto superior improvements to the zoning code, while
acknowledging the quasi-judicial nature of rezoning and monitoring for
abuse accordingly.394 As was recognized by the court in Cooper, voters are
an inadequate check on the legislature, particularly in the rezoning context,
because they are “unaware or unconcerned” with such decisions.395 The
judiciary, by contrast, is well suited to engage in an extensive review
process of discretionary decisions of this matter.396 The responses to
Fasano by the courts in Wait and Cabana are both grounded in precedent
and therefore have failed to openly consider contemporary realities of local
zoning boards and voters.397 Courts should acknowledge and consider the
realities of interest group involvement in zoning,398 the relative ease with
which interest groups can capture the discretionary processes of contract
and conditional zoning, and the fact that voters have little incentive to
actively monitor local politics.399 Acknowledging these considerations
leads to the conclusions of the courts in Fasano, Cooper, and Snyder:
rezoning decisions have to be subject to higher levels of review.
In order to apply the Fasano standard to contract and conditional zoning,
courts should specifically look for instances where evidence of agency
392. See, e.g., PENNINGTON, supra note 162, at 113–14 (concluding that zoning should be
outlawed after conducting a Hayekian and public-choice-based analysis); Ellickson, supra
note 244, at 779 (concluding that zoning is inefficient and that unless efficiency-based
changes are made “[t]he elimination of all mandatory zoning controls . . . is . . . probably
desirable”).
393. It should be recalled that zoning is a common and accepted practice in nearly every
jurisdiction in the United States, so outlawing it would require drastic change. See supra note
2 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 472–73 (Fla. 1993)
(discussing how local zoning boards have too much discretion resulting in zoning decisions
being political in nature, and how stricter judicial review can counter that problem); Cooper
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 614 P.2d 947, 951 (Idaho 1980) (noting that “allow[ing] the
discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually unlimited in the determination of
individual rights is to condone government by men rather than government by law” and how
the judiciary is well suited to review such decisions).
397. See supra notes 135, 146 and accompanying text.
398. See supra Part II.F.
399. See supra Part II.B. Empirical evidence suggests that voters do not monitor local
politics. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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capture appears present,400 such as those in Giger, Durand, and Hector
where legislators actively negotiate for terms different than those originally
proposed. While this Note, like Fasano, does not suggest an “absolute
standard[] or mechanical test[],”401 it does suggest a general approach that
places the burden of proof on the zoning board to show that the rezoning is
consistent with the intended purposes of zoning and is not motivated by
interest group lobbying. While this standard will undoubtedly make
contract and conditional zoning more costly, and perhaps even lead to
municipalities avoiding the practices completely, the dangers of making
desirable change more difficult are outweighed by the dangers of interest
group capture of the zoning process.402 Courts should also ignore whether
a legislative or administrative body made the contract or conditional
rezoning decision, as both are subject to the same general public choice
Doing so will also deprive
concerns caused by self-interest.403
administrative acts in contract and conditional zoning of the presumption of
validity.404
This solution addresses the concerns of all sides of the conflict. Those
states and commentators that feel contract and conditional zoning are too
beneficial to give up will be able to keep the procedure.405 States like
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, that worry that contract and conditional
zoning are inconsistent with statutory uniformity requirements or bargain
away the police power,406 as well as historical decisions that feared
corruption and favoritism,407 will have a mechanism through which to make
sure that the particulars of the rezoning are not nonuniform, do not bargain
way the police power, and were not the product of corruption, while not
losing out on the benefits that the procedures provide.408 And for states that
have yet to decide on the issue, this solution could provide a middle ground
on which they are comfortable operating.409

400. One “tip off” of rent-seeking, and subsequently agency capture, that judges could be
instructed to look for is when the law treats one group differently from another. See Randy
E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through The Lens of Lee Optical, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 845, 857 (2012).
401. See Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or. 1973).
402. See id.
403. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. It may, in fact, be more crucial to
eliminate the presumption of validity for administrative acts, as that presumption is based on
the questionable logic that persons in those positions are experts. See supra note 148 and
accompanying text. The general Hayekian observation that decision makers lack the
necessary knowledge required would indicate that experts cannot make decisions with as
much accuracy as might be perceived. See Hayek, supra note 257, at 521–22.
405. See supra Part III.A–B.
406. See supra Part III.C.
407. See supra Part III.A.
408. See supra Part III.C.
409. See supra Part III.D.

2013]

ZONING WITHOUT ROMANCE

1963

CONCLUSION
The law has, in large part, ignored the realities of human nature as
observed by the public choice theorists and instead has opted to rely on a
false and romantic vision of lawmakers. Contract and conditional zoning
are two areas in which this romantic vision has led to jurisdictions failing to
recognize the danger. This Note has advocated, first and foremost, that
jurisdictions acknowledge these realities and craft legislation accordingly.
In the contract and conditional zoning realm, this acknowledgement
suggests one of two solutions. Either, both contract and conditional zoning
should be prohibited completely to avoid self-interested legislators using
the system to appease interest groups at the expense of the general public.
Or, if the efficiency gains made by contract and conditional zoning are too
strong to forego, then courts should review these decisions under a Fasanolike standard of review that instructs judges to look for agency capture.

